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In studies on civil society, there is a tendency to perceive it as an instrument for
the transition from an authoritarian system of government to a democratic one. It
is not taken as a societal entity in an already consolidated democracy that
contributes to the making of public policies. This is also the case when it comes to
studies on civil society in Turkey. Assuming that Turkey has a consolidated
democracy, this article investigates the extent to which one comes across
impediments to, prerequisites of, and the primary characteristics of civil society in
this country. It arrives at the conclusion that at least in the Turkish case, one may
not talk about the presence or absence of civil society; one may come across only
some of its characteristics and not others.
Keywords: transition to democracy; consolidated democracy; contribution to
policy-making; civil society; Turkey
In the literature on the relationship between civil society and democracy, the question
of which is a prerequisite and which is a consequence has not been resolved, though
the prevalent view is that a vibrant civil society (often defined in terms of high levels
of membership and frequency of activism) is a prerequisite for democracy. For
instance, late Ernest Gellner (1994, 189) had come to the conclusion that without civil
society, the development of democracy is hardly possible. One assumption in the post-
Soviet Union era concerning Central and Eastern Europe has also been that in order
for a democratic system of government to flourish in the countries in these regions,
there is a need for the development of civil society that would limit the authority of
the state (Diamond 1994, 8). The role the civil society has played in the transitions to
democracy in several Eastern European countries has been viewed in the same light
(Geremek 1992; Weigle and Butterfield 1992; Bernhard 1993; Smolar 1996; Uhlin
2009).
There is also a different category of literature that does not necessarily expect civil
society to bring about a transition to democracy, but foresees civil society to make
contributions to public policies and programmes. According to this literature, the civil
society does not challenge the legitimacy of the political regime; it would rather have
a relatively harmonious relationship with that regime, and it is thus able to contribute
to the making of public policies and programmes.
The primary characteristics of this type of civil society are pluralism, toleration
and civility; altruism, leading to the pursuit of the common good as the members of
civil society themselves perceive it; emphasis on consensus; and the mutual
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dependence of the state and civil society.1 In brief, the civil society in question
connotes an organized associational life that is in search for a better society through
public deliberation.2
It is true that empirical reality in respect to the primary characteristics of civil soci-
ety mentioned here would show variations from one context to another. Indeed,
students of political theory and comparative politics have taken civil society as a
venue of ‘natural affections and sociability’ as well as an arena where man ‘regards
other men as means’; it connotes ‘rights’ but also property, civility but also economic
exploitation; and it invokes both the legally free individual and the community of free
individuals (Seligman 1992, 3).
However, such objections to the present formulation of civil society are concerned
with the question of to what extent the emergence of civil society we have in mind is
probable. The students of civil society on which we draw upon in this essay have
been, instead, preoccupied with the question of what type of civil society would best
contribute to the flourishing of good society, by coming up with policies and
programmes appropriate to that end.
This second conceptualization of civil society comes close to the model compris-
ing ideal types formulated by Max Weber (1968). When one works with such a model,
the empirical reality cannot be expected to exactly fit the ideal types in question
(Martindale 1959, 69). Consequently, in such situations, one does not address oneself
to the question of whether or not the empirical reality exactly fits a certain model; one
only endeavours to show to what extent the former comes close to the latter (Freund
1968, 109).
This article adopts a model of civil society to study the contributions of civil soci-
ety to public policy-making in consolidated democracies. This is because, if the
consolidation of democracy is defined ‘democracy becoming the only game in town’,
Turkey may be considered to have a consolidated democracy (Heper 1994; Özbudun
and Yazıcı 2004; Kalaycıo [gbrev]lu, Ergüder, and Çarko [gbrev]lu 2007). However, as democracy
in Turkey has had its own ups and downs since the transition to democracy in 1945,
almost all of the studies on civil society in this country have tended to focus on the
role of civil society in respect to the (strong) state and democracy, rather than its
contribution to public policy-making.
In this context, some students of civil society have noted that Turkey has had too
strong a state and that this situation has left little scope for the emergence of an effi-
cacious civil society (Alpay 1991; Tosun 2001). Most others addressed themselves to
the questions of (1) how civil society has challenged various government policies
concerning political, economic, and social issues; and (2) which alternative policies
civil society itself would have formulated about these issues.3
As a consequence, these studies have not dealt with the question of under what
type of conditions civil society and governments would have close working relations,
and how in the process, civil society would be able to contribute to the public policy-
making.4 The present study attempts to fill this vacuum. Thus, this article dwells upon
the impediments and prerequisites vis-à-vis the flourishing of civil society as well as
the consequent primary characteristics of civil society in consolidated democracies.
All in all, the present article aims to identify (1) the circumstances and factors that
impede and/or facilitate the development of civil society in question, (2) the resultant
characteristics of that civil society in the case of Turkey, and (3) the consequent ability
of the civil society in Turkey to effectively contribute to public policy-making in the
country.
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Impediments to and prerequisites for civil society
Impediments
Widespread populism, clientelism, opportunism, and personalism (as against individ-
ualism) would constitute one set of impediments to the emergence and development
of civil society. Virtually, sole emphasis on interest politics and rights-based individ-
ualism may encourage all kinds of egoistical acts. If government policies benefit
almost solely one’s own political supporters, it may create a situation where some
groups in society may be less able than others to participate in civil societal activities
(Hall 1995, 14).
Secondly, such developments as state-led modernization, industrialization, and/or
economic development as well nation-building may work against civil society having
autonomy from the state (Hall 1995, 12–13). In different degrees and manners, each
of the above phenomena would lead to authoritarian systems of government (Hall
1995, 8). Consequently, little scope would be left for the development of autonomous
voluntary organizations or associations. Moreover, under such circumstances, the
designation of the common good by people, as they themselves see it, would also
become impossible, because that task would in all probability be monopolized by the
state itself.
Last but not least, such phenomena as ethnic nationalism, religious fundamental-
ism, and closed ideologies of different hues and colours would render the development
of civil society almost impossible (Hall 1995, 16–17; Turner 2000, 31).5 In such cases,
homogeneity and unanimity would be the ultimate goals, leaving little scope for
pluralism. Exclusive identities and disrespect for the ‘other’, deriving from dogmatic
tenets and rigid traditions as well as closed ideologies, would carry the day, all of
which would discourage free dialogue and debate among and within the constituent
spheres of civil society.
Prerequisites
One of the most important prerequisites for the flourishing of civil society is the pres-
ence of countervailing powers to the central authority (Hall 1995, 4).6 The inability of
the centre to dominate the periphery opens the way for a polity where the name of the
game is not suppression, but negotiation and persuasion. It is under such circum-
stances that societal elements would not be smothered by the state (Foley and Edwards
1996, 44).
Historically, major institutions that limited the powers of the state turned out to
be aristocracy7 and/or middle class. In the case of the latter, there was a need for that
class to comprise entrepreneurs rather than bureaucratic and/or other elite elements,
for bureaucratic stratum and/or intelligentsia would not necessarily cherish liberal
practices; thus, they would not in all probability have a sympathetic attitude towards
voluntary associations. Furthermore, entrepreneurial middle classes would in general
be the supporters of the rule of law, for they need an environment where the
members of these classes are protected against all kinds of encroachments towards
their rights and where contracts they enter into would be under the protection of the
state. In any case, the rule of law is indispensable for freedom of expression, which
in turn facilitates dialogue within and among the constituent units of civil society.
The second significant prerequisite for the development of civil society is the
existence of a market economy.8 Where there is a market economy, the bulk of the
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resources that a country commands is not controlled by the state. The non-monopoli-
zation of these resources by the state in turn makes the autonomy from the state of
business firms as well as other societal institutions possible. Moreover, market econ-
omy, which is more productive than alternative models of economic system, enables
the members of civil society to have at their disposal more resources that they can use
for civil societal activities (Shils 1997b, 331).
The spread of literacy and mass print culture constitutes the third vital prerequisite
for civil society. Civil society is a debating society writ large. Both among and within
its constituent spheres, there should be a continuous and lively discussion of the
social, economic, and political issues. For that debate to be meaningful, the parties
involved should be well informed concerning the three sets of issues in question (Hall
1995, passim).
For debate among the constituent spheres of civil society to take place, there
should be horizontal linkages among those spheres, the fourth significant prerequisite
for the development of civil society. If historically a society evinced a segregative
structure, there would be a need to desegregate that structure so that the development
of reciprocal and cooperative relations among constituent spheres of civil society
would flourish (Eberly 2000, 17).9
One should also not come across an in-group–out-group orientation among the
members of civil society, the fifth prerequisite. Such an orientation is usually an
upshot of lack of trust among people. Trust among people is yet another important
prerequisite for civil society, for in its absence, widespread dialogue and exchange of
ideas would not be possible (Newton 2001, 202).
Primary characteristics of civil society
Where, on the whole, the impediments mentioned above have been absent and the
prerequisites delineated above have been present, it would be possible for a civil soci-
ety to flourish. One of the characteristics of that civil society would be pluralism.
Pluralism in question turns out to be two-fold. Firstly, such distinct spheres as politics,
economy, and religion would have autonomy from the others. Secondly, internally
each of those spheres would function in a plural manner. In both cases, there would
not be hegemonic domination on the part of any of those spheres, for civil society is
a venue of conflict as well as consensus (Shils 1997b, 330). It follows that civil society
is a venue where several societal and political actors meet, interact, and discuss in
order to arrive at a view all of them can live with.
Pluralism by its very nature leads to disagreement. In civil society, disagreement
is looked upon as inevitable, for dialogue rather than the imposition of certain views
upon others is the name of the game. In civil society, disagreement turns out to be non-
hostile; the parties to the dialogue endeavour to reach a common point rather than try
to refute each and every point made by the others. By common point, the reference is
not to unanimity but, as pointed out, to consensus. Thus, dialogue would become
productive and civil society would manage to come up with its own constructive and
feasible policies and programmes. This would render civil society an efficacious actor
vis-à-vis the state.
It should also be noted that in two senses, the consensus in question would be a
dynamic one. Firstly, for a particular time period, there may be diverse conceptions of
the common good, and in good faith, the members of civil society would strive to
arrive at a consensus on what is perceived as the common good. Secondly, the
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members of civil society would adopt a future orientation in respect to the common
good, keeping in mind that what is presently considered as the common good may not
be in the best interest of the future generations (Walzer 1992, 98; Shils 1997b, 346).
Altruism is yet another important characteristic of the members of civil society.
Altruism is one of the factors that lead the members of civil society to have a
concern for the common good. The latter would facilitate arriving at a consensus.10
In the process, members of civil society look after the interests of the others too and
thus promote solidarity with other societal groups. To use Edward Shils’s terminol-
ogy, while conflict is the ‘spice of life’, solidarity is ‘the cradle of altruism’ (Shils
1997a, 97).
Here, it should also be noted that the common good in question is not taken as a
moral idea of social order dictated by such impediments to civil society as ethnic
nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and/or closed ideologies of different types.
Rather, it should be envisaged as an ethical idea of social order. The former is time-
and place-specific and less open to different interpretations, while the latter is formu-
lated in more general terms that can be more easily accommodated to different milieus
and needs. It would thus be easier for the members of civil society to reach consensus
(Eberly 2000, 13).
The members of civil society act in the manner delineated here because they adopt
a responsive and, certainly, a sympathetic attitude towards others’ particular views,
preferences, and interests. After all, the members of civil society need to take into
account others’ views, preferences, and interests when formulating the common good.
It follows that the common good discussed here would be arrived at as a consequence
of efforts to reconcile the particular and the general. It should also be underlined here
that the particular and the general can be reconciled only by those who do not focus
exclusively either on the particular or on the general. Thus, neither the (strong) state,
as defined by Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985), nor interest groups, such as
trade unions, businessmen’s associations, and the like, can be considered as civil soci-
etal organizations. It follows that pressure groups rather than interest groups can be
construed as civil societal organizations.
Since deliberations in civil society are conducted in a collective manner, another
characteristic of civil society is toleration. Toleration involves considering the
‘other’ at least equal in dignity, intelligence, and trustworthiness, and thus having
respect for the other (Shils 1997b, 338). Collective decision-making is not possible
unless egalitarianism as a principle governs the relations among the parties involved
in deliberation.
In collective decision-making, egalitarianism is complemented by civility, which
involves displaying courtesy and skill of conducting a debate without acting in an
offensive manner to others. Toleration makes possible joint endeavours; civility helps
to maintain a smooth dialogue among parties. Civility also contributes to a process
vital to civil society – participants to a debate not only being interested in refuting
others’ arguments, but also in viewing such an occasion as an opportunity to learn
from others’ views. They thus become capable of jointly formulating policies and
programmes that no group strongly opposes (Shils 1997b, 320–55).
As for the civil society–state relationship, this particular relationship is more
complex than often realized. According to the received wisdom, civil society topples
authoritarian political regimes from power. Once a more democratic system of
government is set up, civil society tries to prevent that system of government from
drifting to authoritarianism, and from time to time, it doubles as the state when the
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state is unable to attend to some matters deemed important (Tusalem 2007). Civil
society acts in this manner where democracy has not been consolidated.
In the perspective developed here, civil society is expected to conduct itself in other
ways. In a consolidated democracy, civil society is essentially a ‘space of uncoerced
human association’ (Cohen and Arato 1992, 30; Walzer 1992, 89). Civil society prima-
rily acts in an advisory capacity to the state, by coming up with policy and programme
proposals on diverse matters, all with a view to bringing about a ‘better quality of life’.
Turning to the state, for one thing, the state maintains the rule of law and, thus, not
only safeguards civil society against the state functionaries that may be involved in
illegal action against what they consider as ‘undesirable’ elements of civil society, but
also prevents some non-state groups from acting in a similar manner towards the
members of civil society (Shils 1997b, 332). It follows that the state plays a protective
role in respect to civil society, for it regulates all associational activities by fixing their
boundaries (Walzer 1992, 103). For this reason, neither the state nor civil society
would act as rivals vis-à-vis each other; consequently, they do not harbour hostile atti-
tudes towards one another. On the contrary, concerning a number of issues, they
complement each other.
Civil society in Turkey
Impediments to civil society
May one consider populism, clientelism, opportunism, and personalism as obstacles
to the development and flourishing of civil society in Turkey? Historically, in the
absence of intermediary structures, particularly in the Ottoman Empire (circa 1299–
1918), but also in the Republican period (1923 to the present), there has been a direct
relationship between the subjects (in the Ottoman Empire) and the citizens (in the
Republic), on the one hand, and the state, on the other (Mardin 1973; Heper 1980).
The Ottoman sultans considered themselves responsible for the welfare of the people,
and the people, when in need of resources and other amenities, had nowhere to turn to
but the state. In the Republican period, too, one has observed a similar situation,
particularly following the transition to the multi-party period (1945) (Heper 1985, ch.
5). Consequently, if civil society is expected to pay attention to the common good and
if people have to display a certain level of altruism, Turkey has not been the most suit-
able context for such phenomena to hold sway. For in Turkey, rather than forming
horizontal relations with others and trying to oblige the state to act in a responsive
manner to their group interests, peripheral groups have had vertical relations with the
state, expecting the latter to be responsive to their specific interests.11
Throughout the Republican period, there have been intense efforts for moderniz-
ing the country, starting with the process of industrialization and continuing with
economic development in general. At the same time, there have been a gradual and
constant progress towards a more open polity and society. The basic reason behind
this particular evolution has been the fact that modernization was identified with
Westernization, and democracy was viewed as an indispensable component of West-
ernization (Heper 1992, 146). The modernization project in question aimed at bringing
about a transition from a religious community, considered to have been under the
influence of the superstitions and dogmas derived from Islam, to a secular nation, the
members of which were expected to use their own reasoning faculties and not turn to
the Book whenever they were going to make an important decision. The founders of
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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 7
the Republic concluded that the new generation of Turks would comprise people who
would ‘think logically’ (Karpat 1959, 54).
Consequently, as early as 1924 and 1930, Turkey experienced two, though brief,
periods of multi-party politics. They were brief, because they were considered to have
formed a threat to the modernization project in question, not because of an inherent
opposition to a more open polity (Heper 1985, ch. 3). Consequently, as the modern-
ization project made progress, democratization gained speed. Thus, Turkey made a
transition to multi-party politics in the mid-1940s. The military interventions that took
place in the later decades did not aim at long-term authoritarian regimes; the juntas
involved were always of the opinion that they were saving democracy from itself and
that they were not acting out of the corporate interests of the military or of their own..
That must be why while several Latin American countries experienced long-term mili-
tary authoritarianisms, in Turkey, when it intervened, the military always gave a date
for its return to the barracks and kept its promise. Furthermore, from the late 1990s
onwards, another direct military intervention in which the military took power into its
own hands became most unlikely. When the military ousted a coalition government
from power, as in 1997 (the coalition government of the religiously oriented Welfare
Party and the secularly oriented True Path Party), it acted in concert with several insti-
tutions, i.e., universities, courts of law, some political parties, and societal groups. In
addition, the behind-the-scenes interventions of the military in day-to-day politics
have also become somewhat less frequent, though they did not come to a definitive
end. On the other hand, as would be expected, in the wake of the military interven-
tions, there lingered an animosity on the part of those removed from their privileged
positions towards those in the military, polity, and society who were presumed to be
the beneficiaries of these interventions.
In this regard, Turkey’s efforts to become a full member of the European Union
(EU) and consequently its obligation to conform to the acquis communitaire of the EU
also played a significant role. Among other things, the military was deprived of its
executive power over individual ministries. It could no longer be engaged in the
follow-up activities regarding the recommendations that the National Security Coun-
cil (NSC) made to political governments.12 Also, the governments were no longer
obliged to give priority consideration to the recommendations of the NSC (Özbudun
and Yazıcı 2004, 31–47).
The EU has also contributed to civil society’s beginning to play a more significant
role in Turkey. By its 1999 Helsinki and 2002 Copenhagen decisions, the EU facili-
tated Turkey’s reforms concerning the freedom of association in the country (Grigo-
riadis 2009, 58). It has also provided credibility and legitimacy to the demands of civil
societal actors in Turkey. In addition to this outside pressure, civil societal actors, now
gradually empowered by their ‘external ally’, also came up with demands which the
governments were obliged to meet. For instance, the Law on Associations was revised
in a liberal direction. (Tocci 2005, 81). Gradually, state elites as well as political
and economic actors have begun to recognize the increasing importance of civil
society for Turkey’s further political and economic development (Keyman and Öni [scedil]
2007, 283–4).
The overall development delineated here increasingly left more scope for action to
the civil society in Turkey. At the turn of the century, the Turks began to enjoy addi-
tional liberties and rights. Yet, whether presently (May 2010) the intellectually freed
individuals have generally become willing and enthusiastic to take initiative on many,
particularly sensitive, issues, remains a moot point.
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Have such phenomena as ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and/or
closed ideologies of different types rendered the development of civil society in
Turkey impossible? The ethnic separatism first came to the agenda of the republican
Turkey in the early 1920s and lingered on until the end of the 1930s. However, at the
time, it did not, on the whole, lead to a serious cleavage in the society or, for that
matter, in the polity. In fact, it has been suggested that except a few individuals, the
bulk of the political stratum has not viewed the Kurdish rebellions as an ethnic issue
(Heper 2007). In the 1984–1999 period and later, when Turkey experienced similar
‘troubles’, the situation had been somewhat different. Although for the bulk of the
people, it continued to be a non-issue – and consequently this issue has not divided
large numbers of people into opposite camps evincing generalized hostility towards
each other – from time to time, some students of the Kurdish affairs argued that
Turkey faced a rising ethnic nationalism on the part of both the Kurds and the Turks.
The so-called ‘religious fundamentalism’ has posed a greater and longer-lasting
threat to constructive debate in Turkey. From 1970, the date the first religiously
oriented political party was set up, to the present, this issue divided the Turks into two
almost warring camps. It thus turned out to be one of the important reasons behind the
indirect military intervention of 1997. Some concluded that religiously oriented
political parties have had used religion for political purposes.
The issue in question became particularly acute following the 2002 and 2007
general elections, when a religiously oriented political party, the Justice and Develop-
ment Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [AKP]), won these elections and ruled the
country as a majority party. This situation made some secularists concerned about the
ultimate aims of the AKP – whether or not the party would try to bring back a state
based on Islam. While the AKP’s leadership cadres, led by Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdo [gbrev]an, have argued that they are pious people and prefer secular politics,
the secularist groups have thought that the AKP has been engaged in takiyye (dissim-
ulation), hiding their ulterior motives until the time is ripe to disclose them. This
conflict has made it impossible for the two groups and their followers to be engaged
even in a semblance of constructive debate.
Prerequisites for civil society
The first prerequisite for the flourishing of civil society is the presence of countervail-
ing powers to central authority. In Ottoman times, the bureaucratic centre managed to
exercise control over all sources of power in the realm (Mardin 1969, 259). Under the
circumstances, there was little scope for the development of any kind of social stratum
with autonomy from the state. Furthermore, the social strata that existed were based
neither on property rights, nor were they, in the Durkeimian sense, ‘secondary struc-
tures’ that could act as countervailing powers vis-à-vis the state. The closest Ottoman
equivalents to intermediary structures were trade guilds, village councils, and tribal
organizations. The latter could not really be considered as intermediary structures,
because they could exercise no control over the activities of the state (Heper 1985,
101; 1991a, 13). In any case, these entities enjoyed only limited autonomy, for their
activities were closely monitored by the bureaucrats appointed by the state (Mardin
1969, 265; 1988, 23–6).
Until the last two decades of the twentieth century, the situation in the Turkish
republic had not been any different. It is true that over the years, there had been a
proliferation of unions, voluntary organizations, associations, and nongovernmental
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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 9
organizations. However, even what had been considered as prominent interest group
associations in Turkey, such as the Industrialists and Businessmen Association of
Turkey (Türkiye Sanayiciler ve [Idot  ][scedil] adamları Derne [gbrev]i [TÜS [Idot  ]AD]), have had little or no
impact on the making of public policies and programmes.13
Turning to the second prerequisite for the development and flourishing of civil
society, i.e., market economy, in the Ottoman Empire, the state dominated not only
society but also economy. The Sultan himself was responsible for the welfare of his
subjects. The major concern of Istanbul, the capital city of the Empire, was of provid-
ing primarily for the welfare of the ruling stratum, for instance, by transferring to the
city adequate foodstuffs, rather than promoting economic development of the country
in general (Mardin 1969, 260).
This situation was coupled with an ethnic division of labour: the Muslims preoc-
cupied themselves with agriculture and the non-Muslims with finance and trade. This
state of affairs further weakened the hand of the social groups vis-à-vis the state. One
upshot of this particular arrangement was that from the early nineteenth-century
onwards, what could pass as interest group associations were, in fact, entities set up
by the state and used by it as its own instruments (Heper 1991a, 15).
By the closing decades of the Empire, the bulk of the non-Muslim economic actors
had chosen an exit strategy and had set up their own states. Thus, when the Republican
Turkey was founded (1923), the country had neither adequate manpower nor capital
for the flourishing of a market economy. Still, between 1923 and 1929, the country
experimented with a liberal economic policy. However, as that policy turned out to be
a failure and, what is more, the country also strongly felt the adverse effects of the
1929 world economic crisis, Turkey adopted in 1930 a state-led economic policy. This
policy continued even after 1950, when the centre-right governments came to power.
Among other things, the number of the state economic enterprises kept going up. In
the process, industrialists and businessmen needed the state as a provider of credit for
the start of new economic ventures. Under such circumstances, the private sector
could hardly challenge the state.
It is true that with the coming to power of the Motherland Party in 1983, Turkey
substituted an export-led economic policy for an import-led one. However, the archi-
tect of this policy, Turgut Özal, Prime Minister from 1983 to 1989, had as his targets
the rendering of the Turkish economy competitive at international markets and the
sidelining of the traditional civil bureaucracy, which he perceived as an obstacle to
the economic policy adopted. Özal did not look with sympathy to the contribution of
the private sector to the devising of economic policies (Heper 1991b, 173–6). This
was apparent from the fact that Özal set up a brand new economy public bureaucracy
(Heper and Sancar 1998, 150–4).
It cannot be denied that at the turn of the century, Turkey had come to have a
dynamic private sector that successfully competed at international markets and
commanded a significant amount of capital. In the process, in some conservative
Anatolian cities, if not in the more progressive major urban centres as Ankara,
Istanbul, and Izmir, a new self-financing middle class emerged and, as a consequence,
there has been a talk of the ‘thickening of civil society’ (Yavuz 2009, 141, 146).
Furthermore, the relationship between these economic groups and the state has
increasingly become one of dialogue. Yet, that dialogue has not been a continuous
one, and in most instances, the last word still belonged to the state.
As to the widespread literacy, a shared means of communication, and a mass print
culture, here Turkey has fared fairly well. In 2004, the literacy rate was 95.5%. That
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10  M. Heper and S. Yıldırım
same year, 95% of homes had a TV set, and the average time period people watched
TV was four and a half hours per day. Also, everyday people spent, on the average,
three hours to listen to radio. The latter constituted 73% of the population; those in the
15–24 years age groups constituting the majority of this population. From the early
1990s onwards, the satellite system and cable TV too became quite widespread,
especially in the urban areas. As to the Internet, at the end of 2006, there were approx-
imately 28,000 cable internet and 3,700,000 ADSL customers. Turning to the print
media, in 2007, Turkey had 5844 periodicals (magazines, newspapers, and other
periodicals) (Heper and Criss 2009, 58–9, 202).
Given these figures, the people in Turkey must have been quite well informed on
the major issues facing the country. One may assume that particularly in the Republi-
can period, one cannot talk of the segregation of people into isolated communities that
would have barred horizontal linkages among the constituent spheres of civil society.
However, whether the presumed well-informed people interacting with each other
have also been engaged in a constructive debate leading to a consensus and, thus,
policy recommendations, is another question. We return to that issue below.
Primary characteristics of civil society
Does one come across pluralism in Turkey, i.e., do any of the different spheres such
as politics, economy, and religion not dominate others, and does each and every such
sphere internally function in a plural manner? Since 1945, there has been multi-party
politics in Turkey. From 1961 onwards, with the adoption of the system of propor-
tional representation in national elections, Turkey experienced a political party infla-
tion. The number of political parties represented in Parliament was reduced to
manageable levels only when Turkey adopted in 1983 a rather high electoral quotient
of 10%. On the other hand, the plurality in the number of parties has not been matched
by pluralism in the internal functioning of those parties; Turkish political parties have
always been dominated by their leaders.14
Furthermore, as noted above, in Turkey, the social groups could hardly impinge
upon the state. One expected consequence of this situation has been the virtual
absence of responsiveness on the part of governments to these groups. For instance,
the economic actors have found it difficult to impinge upon the state actors. In fact,
governments often placed their supporters in the governing bodies of employers’ peak
interest group associations, such as the Union of Chambers and Stock Exchanges of
Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birli [gbrev]i [TOBB]).
From the 1980s onwards, when Turkey adopted an export-oriented economic
policy instead of an inward-looking one, the situation remained not much different
from the earlier periods. It is true that the governments allowed interest group associ-
ations to freely articulate their views and interests; however, whether the governments
have incorporated those views into their policies remained an open question. In any
case, when needed, it was the governments that initiated meetings with the represen-
tatives of the associations in question, and not the other way round. In any case, such
meetings were held infrequently. Consequently, the associations in question
complained that the governments did not include them in the public policy-making.
Although Turkey adopted a market economy and despite the fact that the private
sector began to command rather ample resources from the 1980s onwards, the interest
group associations in the country nevertheless remained as ‘outsiders’ vis-à-vis the
public policy-making (Heper 1991a, 18).
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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 11
Turning to the sphere of religion, in the Ottoman Empire, in general, Islam did not
turn out to be proscriptive concerning state policies; rather, resort was made to this
religion in order to legitimize the policies already made. On the whole, the Muslim
subjects were granted leeway to live their religion in the manner they chose to. It is
true that people turned to religious personages for guidance concerning several issues
in their personal and, to some extent, community lives; yet, the type of Islam, which
was salient, was in general the Sufi version of Islam (Cumhur 1997, 40–2; [Idot  ]nalcık
1997). This version of Islam urges individuals to preoccupy themselves with upgrad-
ing themselves morally and, thus, treating others with tolerance and respect (Sedgwick
2000, passim).
The Sufi version of Islam in the republican Turkey had its origins in the frontier
religion of the Ottomans. The frontier Islam was a mystic, not a doctrinaire, form of
Islam. The Islam in question was influenced to a great extent by Ahmet Yesevi (1093–
1166), a twelfth-century mystic who brought Sufism from Central Asia to Anatolia in
the thirteenth century. The Yesevism was open to all, whether destitute, traveller,
orphan, Muslim, or non-Muslim. Yesevi’s teaching also included a call for altruism.
Some other great humanists of the same era – Yunus Emre (1238?–1320) and
Mevlana Celaleddin-i Rumi (1207–1273) – also left their imprint in the hearts and
faith of the people. Thus, the mystic Islam began to spread in Anatolia in the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries (Karpat 1973, 24–5; Cumhur 1997, 40–2). In the process,
tolerance in the Ottoman Empire implied an acceptance of difference (Rodrique 1995,
85–6; Karpat 2001, 197–8).
In the Republican period, since the 1970s, the Islamist Fethullah Gülen (1941–
present) movement has become quite popular. Its followers are of the opinion that that
the movement has inherited the Sufi heritage of Anatolia (Introvigne 2006, 42). This
idea has gained credence from Gülen’s reference to what Yunus Emre once said: ‘If
you look for God, look for him in your heart. For He is not in Jerusalem, Mecca, or
the Pilgrimage’. 
Gülen movement has had a mixed record in respect to civil society in Turkey. On
the one hand, the movement has placed emphasis on social harmony, tolerance, and
respect for others; on the other hand, by placing emphasis on community rather than
individual, it has not always promoted the formation of a sense of individualism
(Yavuz 2003, 203; Sevindi 2008, 37, 68).
Here, it should also be noted that the Gülen movement has been suspected of being
a supporter of political Islam. There is, in fact, a sharp disagreement in Turkey on
whether or not secularism in the country faces a serious threat. The findings from reli-
able nationwide surveys, however, indicate that people in Turkey have a rather balanced
approach towards the role religion should play in politics and society. For instance, a
2006 nationwide survey found that while 84.2% of the people vote for political parties
that, they think, have internalized secular republican values, 78.2% wish to see that
the same political parties respect their Islamic values and sentiments and pursue policies
along those lines. People in Turkey have also a quite tolerant attitude towards how
others practise their religion. The survey in question has found that a person who
believes in Allah (the Muslims’ God) and His prophet, Muhammad, is considered a
Muslim by 79.9% of respondents, even if that person does not do his or her prayers
(Heper 2009, 416–17). It is patent that as far as the populace in general is concerned,
religion would not act as an obstacle to trust and cooperation among the people.
After all, in the Republican period, all along, an effort has been made to emanci-
pate citizens from the presumed chains engendered by Islam. The goal was to enable
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the people to make their own decisions rather than making resort to the teachings of
Islam. It was for this reason that the Directorate of Religious Affairs (affiliated to the
Prime Ministry) was given the responsibility of seeing to it that the preachers at
mosques delivered sermons along the lines discussed above.15 Islam was also expected
to provide solidarism among the Muslims and serve as an antidote against the radical
ideologies on the right and on the left as well as against ethnic separatism.16
In this context, one sore point throughout the Republic has been the conscious
ignoring of the presence of the country’s Alevis, the Turkish version of Shiites,17 and
thus remaining unresponsive to their needs. Obviously, this particular policy some-
what detracted from pluralism one comes across in such matters in Turkey. This situ-
ation may change in the near future; at the turn of the century, on different occasions,
the Directorate declared that some reforms will be made regarding this issue, though,
up until the present writing, no substantive steps had been taken in this regard.
Does one come across in Turkey friendly disagreement that makes dialogue and
thus reaching consensus possible? One important factor that stands in the way of
dialogue ending up in consensus in Turkey has been the phenomenon of lingering
disagreement in high politics on such questions as political Islam, ethnic separatism,
and even the procedural rules democracy itself, which in turn has led to similar cleav-
ages among the societal actors. It is true that Turkey has had myriad societal organi-
zations and associations, but the latter have been divided among themselves on cultural
and/or ideological issues in question. The tension between the secular TÜS AD and
the religiously oriented MÜS AD (Müstakil Sanayici ve adamları Derne i [Associ-
ation of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen]) is a case in point ( im ek 2004,
61–2). This polarization, which involved an insistence by both parties on ‘absolute
truths’, prevented them from acting in a sensible manner and meeting at a common
ground (Kasaba 1997, 18). To give one important example, neither secular Kemalists
nor Islamists, particularly the former, have shown an inclination to agree on the
common good ( im ek 2004, 63). The ‘secularist’–‘Islamist’ confrontation was inter-
twined with the absence of interpersonal trust, respect for the other, and thus ‘associa-
bility’. This state of affairs at times also displayed an absence of civility on the part of
the members on both sides (Kalaycıo lu 2002, 62–6).
Concerning the state–civil society relations in Turkey, the state in the country has
continued to have its autonomy from society. It is true that the state came up with a
legal order ‘based on criteria, which are universally applicable’ (Toprak 1995, 88), but
the same state has not been able to systematically enforce the laws and regulations
(Kalaycıo lu 2002, 70). As for the society, the latter has always been obliged to
remain in an ‘outsider’ position vis-à-vis the state.
Conclusion
In Turkey, such lingering impediments as populism, clientelism, and opportunism
seem to have prevented the members of civil society from entertaining an idea of a
common good, and this has become an obstacle for the development of a dynamic
consensus when needed. This state of affairs must also have had an adverse impact on
the development of trust among the members of civil society and, consequently, on
the building of horizontal linkages among the members of civil society. Similarly, the
continuing weakness of civil society has prevented it from acting as an efficacious
countervailing power vis-à-vis the state. This is because the state has remained too
strong for the flourishing of an egalitarian relationship between it and civil society.
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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 13
On the other hand, there have been in Turkey a certain degree of modernization,
economic development and industrialization, the spread of literacy, and mass print
culture as well as the consolidation of democracy. It is true that in the post-2002 Turkish
political life, there have been a debate on whether or not the ‘religiously oriented’
government party (the Justice and Development Party) has subscribed to political
Islam. Yet, there has been an absence of a generalized hostility among various elements
in society as a consequence of the fact that one has not come across in Turkey ethnic
nationalism, widespread religious fundamentalism, and closed ideologies with an
impact on society for long periods of time. This must be the reason why in Turkey there
have emerged numerous civil societal entities, and some of them some of the time have
managed to make a difference, despite the great odds we have mentioned. For example,
the Environmental Problems Foundation of Turkey played an important role in the
government’s reversal of its decision to construct a thermal power plant in the town
of Gökova in south-western Turkey. Similarly, The Purple Roof Women Centre Foun-
dation along with the Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey (Türkiye Kadın
Giri [scedil] mciler Derne [gbrev]i [KAG [Idot  ]DER]) and the Association of Supporting and Training of
Women Candidates (to Parliament) (Kadın Adayları Destekleme ve E [gbrev]itme Derne [gbrev]i
[KADER]) set up a platform and played an important role, among other things, in the
amendment of the 1982 Constitution for promoting egalitarianism among men and
women, and husband and wife in Turkey, and lifting Turkey’s reservations to the United
Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (1979).
On the other hand, it is true that in some such instances, one has come across civil
societal entities with high levels of membership and frequency of activism. Yet, for
the most part, such entities had little or no impact on public policies and programmes
for the reasons delineated above.
What might be some of the implications of the findings from the Turkish case for
the general literature on civil society? The pre-transition-to-democracy civil society
and the post-transition-to-democracy civil society mentioned in the ‘introduction’
resemble the two models of civil society drawn up by Foley and Edwards. They have
made a distinction between the so-called ‘Civil Society I’ and ‘Civil Society II’
models. The former model of civil society comprises associational life that is charac-
terized by civility on the part of its members, while according to the latter model, the
civil society is a sphere of action that has its autonomy from the state and, thus, is able
to resist an authoritarian regime (Foley and Edwards 1996).
One extreme example of ‘Civil Society II’ in question has been provided by
Kopeck [yacute] and Mudde (2003, 4), who attributed to ‘uncivil movements’ in Eastern
Europe such civil society functions as acting like advocacy networks. On the other
hand, the model of civil society we have adopted in this article is an elaboration of
‘Civil Society I’ discussed above.
Here, it may be suggested that a transition from ‘Civil Society II’ to ‘Civil Society
I’ would be difficult, for in ‘Civil Society II’, there would develop hostility on the part
of civil society towards the state, and the resultant tension between civil society and
the state may be expected to linger on for long periods of time (Tusalem 2007, 364).
In contrast, in ‘Civil Society I’, civil society and the state would be expected to have
harmonious relations between them.
However, if civil society had hardly played a role in the transition to democracy,
the outcome may be expected to be different. In some such cases as the Turkish one,
there was no need for civil society to take part in the democratizations of the political
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regime, and not having a prejudice towards the state, the emerging civil society came
to display at least some characteristics of ‘Civil Society I’.
Turning to the model of civil society developed and employed in this article, it
should be kept in mind that one cannot definitively argue that there is or there is not
a civil society in a given country. Depending upon the existence and non-existence of
the constellations of impediments and prerequisites, one may come across certain
dimensions of civil society, and not other dimensions, in a particular time and place.
Which constellations of impediments and prerequisites would lead to which kind of
civil society in specific contexts should be the subject matter of future empirical studies.
Needless to point out, such endeavours should be made from a comparative perspective.
Notes
1. We elaborate each of these characteristics of civil society in the following sections.
2. For this definition, the authors draw on Keyman and Öni [scedil] (2007), who in turn have been
inspired by Ehrenberg (1999) and Kaldor (2003).
3. For examples of studying civil society in Turkey from the perspective of the problems of
democracy (and/or citizenship) rather than those of civil society, see Göle (1994), Özbudun
(1997), Sarıbay (1997), and Kadıo [gbrev]lu (2002). 
4. There is one single study of civil society in Turkey, the theoretical perspective of which
comes close to the perspective suggested in the present article ( [Scedil] m [scedil] k 2004). Although
that study looks at somewhat different versions of two prerequisites (existence of a market
economy and horizontal linkages among different spheres of civil society) and different
versions of some characteristics of civil society (existence of friendly disagreement, civil-
ity, and the importance of the rule of law in state–civil society relationship) taken up in this
article, it too takes up the role of civil society in respect to the role it plays concerning the
development of democracy.
5. We assume that ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and closed ideologies would
constitute impediments for the flourishing of a vibrant society, because on the whole, those
who subscribe to such thought patterns do not choose to interact with others in a respectful
manner and, in fact, attempt to impose their preferences on others. It is, of course, possible
that those who have adopted such world views may use peaceful means of persuading their
detractors, though such cases would be expected to constitute the exception rather than the
rule. In any case, the dominant discourse of a civil society in consolidated democracies
should be informed by democratic norms. On this issue, see the country studies in
Alagappa (2004).
6. Hall (1995) provides historical examples of nobility and churches, both acting as counter-
vailing powers to kings.
7. For the importance of aristocracy as a countervailing power, see Bendix (1978, ch. 7).
8. On the relationship between market economy and democracy, see Dahl (1998, ch. 13).
9. It should also be pointed out that in the absence of such horizontal linkages, the vertical
relations between the state, on the one hand, and individuals or the constellations of indi-
viduals, whether formally organized or not, on the other, leave societal actors vulnerable to
undue control from above.
10. That the civil society is concerned with public rather than private interests is underlined,
among others, by Diamond (1994, 6).
11. See, inter alia, Kalaycıo lu (2001, 64).
12. The NSC comprises the president of the Republic, key cabinet members, and the members
of the high command.
13. It is for this reason that, on the whole, the individual holding companies only try to exercise
influence upon bureaucrats responsible for the implementation of policies so as to make it
beneficial for them (Heper 1991a, 17). We make reference to TÜS [Idot  ]AD in this context,
because as already implied above, among all the interest group as well as civil society asso-
ciations, TÜS [Idot  ]AD is considered as the organization with maximum influence over the
Turkish government. We do not consider interest groups as civil society groups, because
in our conceptualization of civil society, civil society groups are not supposed to act as the
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Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 15
spokespersons of a particular interest; rather, they are expected to promote the common
good as they see it and do this while maintaining a harmonious relationship with the state.
Consequently, for us, in addition to the ones we have already alluded to, some other exam-
ples of civil society organizations in Turkey are the Association of the Environmental
Protection and Greening of Turkey (Türkiye Çevre Koruma ve Ye [scedil] llendirme Kurumu
[TÜRÇEK]), the Association of the Protection of Environment and Cultural Values of
Turkey (Çevre ve Kültür De [gbrev] rlerini Koruma ve Tanıtma Vakfı [ÇEKÜL]), the Founda-
tion for Combatting Soil Erosion, Reforestation, and the Protection of Natural Habitat of
Turkey (Türkiye Erozyonla Mücadele, A [gbrev]açlandırma ve Do [gbrev]al Varlıkları Koruma Vakfı
[TEMA]), the Greenpeace of Turkey (Greenpeace Türk), the Purple Roof Women Centre
Foundation (‘Mor Çatı’ – Kadına [Scedil] ddetle Mücadele Vakfı), and the Water Foundation (Su
Vakfı).
14. It must be noted in passing that in Turkey, the absence of intra-party democracy has been
a mixed blessing; in parties such as the Nationalist Action Party and the Justice and
Development Party, the leaders prevented the parties from drifting to anti-system tenden-
cies. This has contributed to the flourishing of civil society.
15. For an elaboration, see Shankland (1999, 28–31).
16. The disagreement among the elites on this issue is a different story, which we take up below.
17. In fact, Alevis do not use the appellation ‘ i'i’ for themselves (Shankland 1999, 139).
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